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Charles Evans Whittaker was the fourth Justice appointed to the
Supreme Court by President Eisenhower. The first three of the Eisen-
hower selections all performed strangely from the standpoint of those
who expect Justices to reflect the political philosophy of the Chief Execu-
tive who chose them. Chief Justice Earl Warren proved to be the
possessor of an ultra-libertarian view of the law and the practitioner of
a policy of judicial activism well calculated to send shudders down
conservative spines. William J. Brennan, Jr., too, generally augmented
the strength of the Court's liberal wing, previously represented only
by Hugo L. Black and William 0. Douglas, two of the Justices placed
on the Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even John Marshall
Harlan, by far the most orthodox of the first three Eisenhower Justices,
kicked over the traces in notable decisions like Cole v. Young,' in which
the Court held that the President had acted illegally when he extended
peremptory security dismissal procedures to employees of non-sensitive
Government departments, and Yates v. United States,2 in which the
Smith Act was held inapplicable to advocacy of forcible overthrow of
the Government as an abstract principle.
On the basis of Whittaker's record as a federal district judge and
as a member of the eighth circuit court of appeals, it was apparent at
the time of his appointment that the new Justice was most unlikely to
transform the Warren-Black-Douglas-Brennan minority into a solid
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington College; A.B., Rutgers
University, 1947; A.M., University of Wisconsin, 1948; Ph.D., Rutgers University, 1957.
1. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
2. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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liberal majority. Nothing that has happened since March 25, 1957, when
Whittaker took his seat as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
has made the prospect any more likely. But the junior Justice-the first
member of the Court ever appointed from Missouri--has done enough
to indicate that he is to be a far less reliable member of the Court's
conservative wing than Justice Stanley Reed, whom he replaced.
Although it is obvious that he will become neither -another Warren nor
another Brennan, there are signs that he may prove at least as much of
a maverick as Harlan. At a time when the vote of such an "uncommitted"
member will probably prove decisive in many momentous cases, great
interest attaches to the clues about Whittaker's philosophy which his
first full year as a Justice has revealed.
The Supreme Court on which Whittaker serves is one of the most
controversial in American history. The case which, more than any other,
made the Warren Court such a storm center was the one in which the
Justices held unanimously that the maintenance of racially segregated
public schools violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 Whittaker, of course, was not a member of the Court
either when the original Brown decision was handed down or when the
decree implementing it -was announced. 4 The two actions, however, pro-
voked a rash of litigation posing the question of whether in specific
instances the criterion, "with all deliberate speed,", had been met. For
more than three years the Supreme Court refused to review such cases
or disposed of them summarily, without argument and without opinion.
It was evident that none of the Justices who had been appointed after
the original school cases were decided-Harlan, Brennan, or Whittaker-
was going to destroy the Court's monolithic unity on the question. But
it was not until September 1958 that the new Justices were given a
chance to endorse publicly-and even expand-the Brown decision.
The occasion, of course, was the Court's special term called to
consider the two-and-one-half-year stay of integration granted to the
school board of Little Rock, Arkansas by Judge Harry- J. Lemley.6 For
a while, Whittaker found himself the center of attention on the issue. As
3. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. Id. at 301.
6. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
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the Justice assigned to the eighth circuit, he was asked by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People to vacate the court
of appeals' stay of its order reversing Judge Lemley, or to stay the
Lemley order, itself. Whittaker discreetly chose to avoid even giving
the appearance that a case of such moment was being decided by one
man. He referred the motions of the NAACP to the entire Court, and
Chief Justice Warren called the special term. Probably the most signifi-
cant stand Whittaker has taken as a Justice was his vote to affirm the
court of appeals' reversal of Judge Lemley's order. For the action meant
that unanimity on the segregation issue was preserved. The importance of
this fact was underlined when the Court took the unprecedented step
of naming all nine Justices as joint authors of the Little Rock opinion.7
Aside from the segregation issue it has been the Warren Court's
stand on questions involving the rights of those accused of political
radicalism which has brought upon it the most violent criticism. On
one phase of this problem-academic freedom-Whittaker had an oppor-
tunity to express himself when he was a district judge. What he did and
said on that occasion will bring him no civil liberties awards.
The case concerned Horace B. Davis, professor of economics at the
University of Kansas City. Dr. Davis, who had achieved academic tenure,
could be dismissed from his position only "for adequate cause." The
issue before Judge Whittaker was whether Davis' refusal to answer
questions relating to his alleged support of Communism constituted
"adequate cause" for dismissing him.8
Davis had. appeared before the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee, headed by Sen. William E. Jenner, on June 9, 1953, in
response to a subpoena. Questioned about his alleged membership in
the Communist Party, he invoked his rights under the fifth amendment
in declining to reply. The university promptly summoned him to an
inquiry at which the chairman of the board of trustees posed questions
similar to those put by the Senate subcommittee. Davis was asked, among
other things, whether he was or had been a member of the Communist
7. The Court emphasized the agreement of Justices Harlan, Brennan, and
Whittaker with the 1954 decision in these words: "Since the first Brown opinion
three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one with the Justices still
on the Court who participated in that basic decision as to its correctness, and that
decision is now unaimously reaffirmed." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
8. Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716, 718 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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Party, "active in the work of the Communist Party," or a supporter of
"Communist activities."9 Denying the right of the university to propound
such questions, he refused to answer. For this action, he was discharged
from his position. Judge Whittaker had to decide whether the university
had the power to punish the professor for remaining silent rather than
furnish information which might be used against him.
Whittaker upheld the power of the university to fire Davis. He went
much further, however, by adding that the trustees had a positive
obligation to act as they did. They would have been remiss in their
duties had they done otherwise. Whittaker admitted that the professor
had a constitutional right to refuse to answer the questions. "But he
did not have a constitutional right to remain a public school teacher,"'1
he added. The college was entitled to know whether its faculty members
belonged to "a found and declared conspiracy by a godless group to
overthrow our government by force." Whittaker showed no sympathy
with Davis' conception of academic freedom. On the contrary, he implied
that a teacher, because of his "most intimate position to mould the minds
of the youth of the country," had a special obligation to be candid about
his political views. The judge spared no adjectives to express his whole-
hearted endorsement of the policy followed by the university. He said:
.The public will not stand, and they ought not to stand, for such
reticence or refusals to answer by the teachers in their schools.
And the University officials would have been derelict in their
duties had they not asked plaintiff-in the light of his refusal to
answer the Senate subcommittee's questions as to whether he
was a Communist-whether he was or ever had been a member
of the Communist Party, and, having asked him those questions,
and he having refused to answer them, would have been derelict
in their duties, and would have destroyed the University, had
they not dismissed him."
When the nomination of Whittaker to the Supreme Court was before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Davis' attorney, Fyke Farmer, appeared
in opposition to confirmation. He felt that the opinion in the Davis case
9. A detailed description of the Davis proceedings appears in 43 Bulletin of the
American Association of University Professors 177-95 (1957).
10. Whittaker erred in calling the University of Kansas City, which is a private
institution, a public school. His error is odd, since he himself attended one of the
university's branches, its law school.
11. Davis v. University of Kansas City, supra note 8, at 718.
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had demonstrated that Whittaker had "a personal predilection, amount-
ing to a prejudice or bias, against fundamental principles of the Con-
stitution and [was] opposed to human liberty."' 2 No member of the
Committee demonstrated a shred of agreement with Farmer's position.
Several, quite the reverse, pilloried the witness for a variety of sins
ranging from his support of world government 13 to his admitted "sym-
pathies for international communism."14 Commenting on Farmer's
opposition, Whittaker told the Senators that in the Davis case he had
"declared no new law. I followed the adjudicated cases. They are clear."' 5
With little delay and no disagreement, Whittaker was approved by
both the Committee and the Senate for the position in which he might
very well have to declare "new law" and blaze new trails in the absence
of "adjudicated cases." And, as it turned out, very soon after he took his
seat as Associate Justice, he had to participate in an academic freedom
case reminiscent of the Davis suit.
This time the petitioner was a Philadelphia public school teacher
of 22 years standing. Herman A. Beilan was dismissed from his position
for declining to answer questions relating to Communist affiliations and
activities. This refusal, the local board of education held, constituted
"incompetency," a ground for discharge under the Pennsylvania tenure
law. Whittaker cast the decisive fifth vote rejecting Beilan's contention
that his discharge violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 6 Having decided that a teacher could be labelled incompe-
tent on the basis of unwillingness to discuss his political background, the
Court majority had no trouble ruling on the same day that a New York
12. Hearings on the Nomination of Charles E. Whittaker of Missouri to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 30. Although questioning by Committee members indicated consider-
able knowledge of various aspects of Farmer's career, there was no sign that anyone
remembered him as the attorney who persuaded Justice William 0. Douglas to stay
the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S.
273, 276 (1953). Farmer was the "counsel representing one Edelman" referred to
at 282-83.
15. Hearings 33.
16. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). The majority opinion,
written by Justice Harold H. Burton, was also endorsed by Justices Tom Clark and
John Marshall Harlan. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a separate concurrence.
There were dissents by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
and Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Hugo L. Black concurred.
1959]
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subway conductor who remained similarly silent might be considered
identically incompetent. Again Whittaker's vote was crucial. 17
It is thus apparent that Justice Whittaker has the same views on
academic freedom as Judge Whittaker had before him. But on another
aspect of civil liberties-the Justice Department's deportation policies-a
little more development has been exhibited.
As a district judge, Whittaker had to decide a curious case in this
category. An alien under deportation order for dealing in narcotics and
for having entered the United States unlawfully claimed that he was
entitled to suspension of the order. The law he cited gives the Attorney
General the right to suspend deportations of aliens who have been present
continuously in the United States for the ten preceding years. Here, how-
ever, the ten years had been punctuated by a visit of approximately one
hour to Canada. Whittaker decided that the brevity of the Canadian
stay was irrelevant; the requisite ten-year period had been broken and
the discretionary relief sought by the alien was not available to him.18
A one-day departure from the country figured in another alien case
which Whittaker had to judge, this time as a member of the Supreme
Court. An alien, Frank Bonetti, who entered the United States in 1923
at the age of fifteen, was a member of the Communist Party from 1932
through 1936.- The following year he went abroad to fight with the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade on the side of the Spanish Republic and gave
up all rights of.residence in this country. But in 1938 he returned as a
quota immigrant and resided here continuously except for a one-day visit
to Mexico in 1939. Since the Internal Security Act of 1950 provides for
the deportation of any alien who "was at the time of entering the United
States, or has been at any time thereafter" a member of the Communist
Party, the question was: which of the three entries was the relevant one?
If the "time of entering" was 1923, the alien had been a Communist
"thereafter" and was, as a consequence, deportable. If, on the other hand,
the "time of entering" was 1938 or 1939, the deportation statute could
not be applied, since there was no accusation of Communist membership
after 1936.
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, held that the later dates were
17. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
18. United States v. Sweet, 133 F. Supp. 3 (W). Mo. 1955).
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controlling and that Bonetti, therefore, was not deportable. It was Whit-
taker who wrote the opinion resolving the ambiguity in favor of lenity.1-9
He approvingly quoted an earlier case in which Justice Felix Frank-
furter had said that it is "a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts
. . . against the imposition of a harsher punishment.' 20 Whittaker's
rejection of severity was especially striking coming as it did from the
pen of a Justice who, three short years earlier, had ordered the deporta-
tion of Angelo Frank Bruno because of his short-lived foray across the
Canadian border.21
Six months before the Bonetti decision, however, Whittaker had
already indicated at least a slight softening of his position on alien cases.
The intimation came as he spoke for a unanimous Court in reversing
the conviction of Knut Heikkinen, an elderly Finnish editor, accused of
willfully failing to make arrangments for his departure from the country
within six months of the issuance of a final deportation order against him
for having been a Communist. The Court found that the alien had
demonstrated no willfulness, since he had understandably relied on an
Immigration Service official who had advised him that "arrangements to
effect your deportation . . . are being made and when completed you
will be notified when and where to present yourself for deportation. '22
Since both Bonetti and Heikkinen dealt narrowly with odd and pos-
sibly unique sets of circumstances, they probably established no prece-
dents. The Heikkinen decision, for example, did not turn-as it might
have-on the constitutionality of the McCarran Act's self-deportation
requirement. Nor did Bonetti rest on the ex post facto clause of the Con-
stitution,23 which it can be contended is violated whenever an-alien is
deported for an act which was not proscribed when it was performed.
There is, in fact, no intimation that Whittaker was disturbed by con-
stitutional questions raised by the two cases. As far as Bonetti was con-
cerned, moreover, there is a fairly clear indication that he would have
acquiesced in the deportation had it not been challengeable on narrow,
technical grounds.
The hint is contained in another majority opinion which Whittaker
19. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
20. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
21. United States v. Sweet, supra note 18.
22. Heilddnen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273, 277 (1958).
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, 4 9.
1959]
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wrote for the Court sustaining the right of Congress to provide for the
deportation of aliens for past offenses which were not grounds for
deportation when they were committed.24 Whittaker did not attempt
to sugarcoat the fact that "Congress was legislating retrospectively" 2 5
in the McCarran Act. He held, however, that it had a right to pass such
legislation "to cover offenses of the kind here involved." 26 This viewpoint
was in marked contrast with that of Justice Black, whom Justice Douglas
joined in dissent. Black condemned as too narrow the idea that the
ex post facto clause forbids only retroactive legislation providing criminal
penalties. Banishment is "punishment of the most drastic kind," he
said, although it is not part of a criminal proceeding.
27
This case is not the only one which demonstrates that Whittaker's
opinions in Bonetti and Heikkinen should not be taken as indicating a
complete turnabout on the deportation problem. For, since he took his
seat on the Supreme Court, Whittaker has also voted to deport a former
Communist although his membership in the party was apparently not a
"meaningful association,"2 and to deport a native Chinese on the ground
that since, in a technical sense, she was an alien seeking admission, she
was not "within the United States" as she would have to have been
to qualify for the withholding of her deportation. 29
In contrast with aliens, natural-born citizens have understandably
felt that they were exempt from banishment decrees. During the
Supreme Court's 1957-58 term, however, they learned that their com-
placency was by no means justified. In a group of monumental cases,
the Court upheld the right of the Gov6rnment to expatriate citizens, even
though it interpreted the right narrowly.30 In all three cases involved,
Whittaker joined the Court's liberals-Warren, Black, and Douglas-in
condemning the expatriation attempts.3 But he did not expressly provide
24. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957).
25. Id. at 690.
26. Ibid. The same holding was contained in Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S.
692 (1957), a companion case, decided on the same day.
27. Lehmann v. Carson, supra note 24, at 691.
28. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957).
29. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). See also Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 149 (1958); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 669 (1958); Maisen-
berg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670, 673 (1958).
30. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
31. Brennan, who is far more often than Whittaker found in the company of
Warren, Black, and Douglas, deserted his usual voting partners in the Perez case,
which as a consequence was decided 5-4 in favor of expatriation. The other two
cases held against expatriation-Trop by a 5-4 vote, and Nishikawa by a 7-2 vote.
[Vol. 24
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a constitutional foundation for his opposition to the expatriation efforts
made in these cases. In fact, he specifically affirmed his belief that "Con-
gress may expatriate a citizen for an act which it may reasonably find to
be fraught with danger of embroiling our Government in an international
dispute or of embarrassing it in the conduct of-foreign affairs. 32 He felt
simply that the relevant statute, expatriating citizens for "voting in a
political election in a foreign state," was too broadly written to be
sustained on the ground that it was an attempt to avoid placing the
Government in an awkward position.33
There is, however, an incomprehensible inconsistency in Whittaker's
attitude on the subject of expatriation. For in the Trop case, decided on
the same day, he subscribed to a Warren opinion which denied precisely
what Whittaker affirmed in his Perez dissent-that citizenship may be
taken away by Congress. In the Chief Justice's words, "citizenship is
not subject to the general powers of the National Government and there-
fore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers."3 4
Although Whittaker's dissenting memorandum in Perez may more
accurately represent his position than his endorsement of Warren's
opinion in Trop, the latter case was in one significant respect more
important than the former. For in it the Supreme Court struck down
a section of an act of Congress-only the 81st time in American history
that the Court's ultimate power has been exercised. By supporting this
action, Whittaker would seem to have rejected early in his Supreme
Court career the view-represented most prominently by Justice Frank-
furter-that the judicial branch should refrain, almost at all cost, from
invalidating federal laws. 35 It may prove of the utmost importance that
Whittaker's first vote to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional was
cast in a case in which a personal, rather than a property, right was at
stake.
The cases indicate, however, that Whittaker's attachment to prin-
ciples of individual freedom will have to become considerably more
consistent if he is to be thought of as a libertarian Justice. His record
32. Perez v. Brownell, supra note 30, at 84. This attitude was in sharp contrast
with the Warren-Black-Douglas position that Congress may not constitutionally
authorize involuntary expatriation for any actions whatever. Id. at 62.
33. Id. at 84.
34. Trop v. Dulles, supra note 30, at 92.
35. E.g., see Frankfurter's dissent in Trop. Id. at 119-20, 128.
1959]
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in the 1957-58 term is riddled with contradictions if devotion to-or
disregard for-individual rights is used as the standard of measurement.
On the one hand, for example, he voted to negate California's attempt
to deny tax exemptions to veterans or church organizations refusing
to take loyalty oaths36 and to overturn the Army's practice of issuing
less than "honorable" discharges to soldiers because of their pre-induc-
tion activities.3 7 On the other hand, he dissented when the Court held
that Congress had not authorized the Secretary of State to deny passports
to individuals whose loyalty he doubted.
3 8
During Whittaker's freshman year as a Justice, the Supreme Court
was under almost as heavy attack for its pronouncements regarding the
administration of criminal justice as for its rulings in political cases.
Whittaker came to the Supreme Court with a record which contained
only scattered intimations of what his attitude might be on this subject.
Although none of the decisions he rendered in the lower federal courts
lend themselves to facile extrapolation, one of the opinions betrayed a
healthy disinclination to approve whatever the police consider necessary
for "combatting crime." The case concerned a man arrested under the
Dyer Act. After a court had determined that he was not mentally com-
petent to stand trial, he was committed to the custody of the Attorney
General until he could intelligently assist in his defense or until it was
ascertained that his incompetency was permanent. After more than a
year and a half, the Attorney General had not yet certified him either
as competent or as hopelessly incompetent, and the luckless victim sought
a writ of habeas corpus to achieve his freedom from what had all the
earmarks of indefinite detention.
Whittaker held that the Attorney General had no right to persist in
holding the accused. "[C] are must be taken," he said,
to see that the period consumed in determining his competency
or incompetency to stand trial upon those charges does not
approximate, and certainly does not exceed, the probable
sentence-less 'good' time-he would have received and served
had he pleaded, or been found, guilty as charged, for that would
be to turn the statutory shield into a sword.3 0
36. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); First Unitarian Church v. Los
Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
37. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
38. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
39. Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
[Vol. 24
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During Whittaker's first year as a Justice, the Supreme Court
decided what was to become a cause celebre concerning police methods.
In Mallory v. United States, 40 the Justices reversed a District of Columbia
rape conviction-and death sentence-based upon a confession held to
have been obtained in violation of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires that an arrested person be taken
before a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Whittaker
went along with the opinion which Justice Frankfurter wrote for a
unanimous Court. But, controversial though the Mallory decision proved
to be, 41 it was based on construction of a rule rather than on constitu-
tional interpretation and Whittaker's vote for it was not necessarily a
clear-cut indication that he would define broadly the constitutional
protections of persons accused of crime. Considered in this sense, a later
case, in which Whittaker wrote the majority opinion, was more revealing.
Like Mallory, the other case concerned a Negro. The charge here
was first-degree murder. The accused was convicted and sentenced to
death after a trial in which the court received in evidence a confession
he termed coerced and false. The Supreme Court, by a 7-2 vote, reversed
the conviction as violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Whittaker, who was author of the opinion, summarized the facts
under which the State of Arkansas obtained the confession. Among
other things, it was brought out, the accused was arrested without a
warrant, not advised of his constitutional rights, held incommunicado for
three days, and then told by the chief of police that a confession would
probably save him from "thirty or forty people" who "wanted to get him."
A confession extracted under such circumstances, said Whittaker, was
coerced, even though there was no physical torture. The Justice made
short shrift of the argument that, aside from the confession, there was
enough evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict. "[N]o one can
say," he noted, "what credit and weight the jury gave to the con-
fession." 42
On the same day that Whittaker delivered this opinion, the Court
announced its decision in another capital case involving a Negro who
40. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
41. A widely-supported bill (H.R. 11477) to reverse its effect died during the
closing hours of the 85th Congress, when Vice-President Nixon sustained a technical
point of order against a conference report on the measure. 104 CONG. REC. 18101
(daily ed. August 25, 1958).
42. Payne v. Arkansas, 256 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
1959]
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claimed that his confession had been obtained through the use of methods
* barred by the Constitution. This time, however, Whittaker cast the
deciding vote that doomed the accused. At issue was the admissibility of
a confession made to an Arizona justice of the peace twenty hours after
the accused, who had been placed under arrest, had been lassoed twice
by local ranchers and once jerked "in the general direction of both the
Sheriff's car and the nearest trees. '43 The Supreme Court, by a 5-4
vote,44 sustained the conviction. Whittaker subscribed to an opinion by
Justice Tom Clark holding that the confession was acceptable since it
was made in a court and in the presence of a sheriff who had protected
the accused during the roping episode. 45
Thus was the case distinguished for Whittaker from the Arkansas
appeal decided the same day. This was not the only time that a Whit-
taker decision seems to have rested on what some might consider a
relatively insignificant wrinkle in the factual setting rather than a pas-
sionate insistence that the most exacting standards be applied to police
activities. There would not appear to have been much doctrinal con-
sistency between two right-to-counsel cases on which Whittaker voted,
either. In Moore v. Michigan,46 he cast the crucial fifth vote which
granted a new trial to a Negro whose waiver of counsel was apparently
induced by fear of mob violence; but in Crooker v. California47 his vote
was decisive in another 5-4 decision, which sent to his death a convicted
murderer whose confession had been obtained after his repeated requests
for counsel were denied by police.
In cases involving accusations of unreasonable searches and seizures,
Whittaker's record is little more consistent. As a judge of the court of
appeals, he voted for a unanimous decision holding that the Post Office
had no right to open a first-class parcel which it suspected contained
narcotics. 48 And, as a Supreme Court Justice, he was on the side of the
majority as it held that District of Columbia police could not lawfully
make a narcotics arrest after they had broken into a home without giving
notice of their authority and purpose.40 But when his colleagues, in still
43. Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 395 (1958).
44. Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented without opinion. Id. at 404.
45. Id. at 400.
46. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
47. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
48. Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957)
49. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
[Vol. 24
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another narcotics case, found that some heroin had been improperly
admitted as evidence since it had been seized during an illegal arrest,
he associated himself with a dissenting opinion by Clark.5 0 In view of
Whittaker's stand in the two previous cases, it was odd that he put his
name to Clark's bitter complaint that the Court had freed "another
narcotics peddler,"5 1 - for the comment indicated exasperation with pre-
cisely the kind of action that Whittaker had approved in the other cases.52
Two other criminal appeals on which Whittaker voted as a Supreme
Court Justice concerned contentions that the constitutional ban on mul-
tiple jeopardy had been violated. One of them arose in the District of
Columbia and therefore directly involved the fifth amendment provision
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Whittaker was in the familiar role of swingman
as the Court freed a man tried twice for first-degree murder.53 In the
second case, a state murder conviction was involved. The majority
opinion, which Whittaker endorsed, held that a man tried and acquitted
for robbery of three persons on the same occasion could be tried again-
and convicted-for robbing a fourth person during the same episode.54
Two dissenting Justices-Black and Douglas-felt that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy applies to state as well as federal
prosecutions. "[B]y that standard," they declared, "this judgment of
conviction should be reversed."5 5 The majority, on the other hand,
recognized the Cardozo view56 that only those safeguards of the double
jeopardy clause which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
are carried over by the fourteenth amendment as restrictions on the
states.5
7
Although Whittaker has written few opinions on economic issues,
his votes demonstrate a generally conservative orientation, particularly
50. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
51. Id. at 489.
52. Burton, who also dissented, was more consistent, since he had approved
Clark's rejection of the majority's reasoning in Miller v. United States, supra note 49.
53. In the first trial, a jury had convicted the accused of second degree murder
on an indictment charging murder in the first degree. When an appeal upset this
conviction, the Government prosecuted again, this time successfully, on the first
degree charge. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
54. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
55. Id. at 477.
56. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1957).
57. Hoag v. New Jersey, supra note 54, at 466, 470.
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in monopoly cases, where he has shown no sympathy for trustbusting
interpretations of the laws." His position in labor cases is somewhat
less predictable, since two important anti-union votes 0 were balanced
by an opinion striking down a Georgia ordinance making it illegal for
labor organizers not granted a city permit to solicit union members.Y°
It is possible that Whittaker's background as a corporation lawyer
helps account for his frame of reference on economic questions. For
thirty years he was with the Kansas City firm of Watson, Ess, Whittaker,
.Marshall, and Enggas. The firm's blue-ribbon clients included the Union
Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads, Montgomery Ward, the City
National Bank and Trust Company, Kansas City Public Service, Min-
neapolis-Moline, and the Kansas City Star. But there is far too little in
the record so far to prove conclusively that on economic issues Whittaker
has lined up irrevocably with the Court's conservatives. He has made
decisions, but he has enunciated no doctrine; he has taken positions, but
he has embraced no philosophy.
This perhaps points to the most valid thing that one can say in
assessing Whittaker's early decisions: in no category of cases has he
adopted so solid a position that modification would be difficult.
Whittaker's atomic approach to the cases has its advantages. It gives
a freshman Justice time to get his bearings, to free himself from what-
ever elements of his past may have limited his vision, and to let his
older colleagues vie with each other in promoting the mature philosophies
they have come to live-and adjudicate-by.
. On the other hand, Justice Whittaker was not a callow youth when
he took his seat on the Supreme Court. Some would perhaps argue that
a man of fifty-six who has no theoretical foundations for his actions is
probably congenitally incapable of developing a thoroughgoing philosophy
of law and government. Whittaker himself admitted-or boasted-
58. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); FTC v. Standard
Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958);
Denver Union Stock Yard v. Livestock Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282 (1958).
59. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Local 1976, United Bhd.
of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93. (1958).
60. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). As an appeals court judge,
Whittaker voted to uphold the extortion conviction of a union official, Schmidt v.
United States, 237 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1956), and he voted not to enforce an order
of the National Labor Relations Board directed against a company's discriminatory
actions toward union members, NLRB v. Burns, 238 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1956).
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shortly after his appointment that he had no political philosophy. He
was conscious of no leanings, he said.61 An astute journalist commented,
"A man who is not conscious of any 'leanings' is a man who has all the
conventional leanings of his time, class and calling. '62
Much of what has happened since indicates that the observation
applied perfectly to Whittaker.63 During a period, however, when the
judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court is becoming increasingly liberal,
his "conventional leanings" may not be able to stand up against the
batterings to which they will be subjected. The platitude which notes
that the future is uncertain thus seems to be a gross understatement
when applied to the judicial thinking of Mr. Justice Whittaker.
61. Kansas City Star, March 3, 1957.
62. IF. Stone's Weekly, March 11, 1957, p. 4, col. 1.
63. In the 1957-58 term, for example, he dissented most often in the company
of Justices Harlan, Burton, and Frankfurter, who in a symbolic drama could easily
be cast as Conventional Time, Conventional Class, and Conventional Calling, respec-
tively. The pattern of his dissents appears in 27 U.S.L. WEK 3022 (July 22, 1958).
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